I. Introduction
The effects of current performance on future payoffs are central to the economics of reputation. Fama (1980) argued that a competitive market for managerial labor will alleviate moral hazard and discipline managers to work. His argument claimed that future wages will depend on past performance, and hence managers will want to perform well. Holmström (1999) further developed this argument and showed that it has of agents supply services to clients for two periods and then retire. Some agents are inherently good, whereas others choose how good to be at a private cost. Clients do not know the agent's type and thus are exposed to both moral hazard (hidden action) and adverse selection (hidden information). Furthermore, clients do not observe the actual identities of the agents running the firms that provide them with services. This central assumption creates a separation of entity from identity: the intangible name of a firm can be traded across agents without clients' observing this trade. The paper's first main insight provides a rationale for an active market for firm reputations, which is precisely the separation of entity from identity. If clients cannot observe trade in names, then good histories command a premium over no histories, which in turn causes good names to have value and to be traded.
The second main insight is that the market for names, which is supported by the presence of adverse selection, can alleviate the problems associated with moral hazard even with short-lived agents. Unlike previous reputation models in which incentives decline with age, here reputation concerns provide incentives for agents throughout their career: young agents are concerned with their future income from providing services, whereas old agents are concerned with their future income from selling their firm's name. The incentives provided by these two mechanisms are quantitatively the same: good names are scarce, and their price will capture the benefits from having such a name. Thus the "ageless" feature of Kreps's equilibrium arises endogenously in the present model.
These two insights depend on the assumption that clients cannot observe trade of names. If clients can observe trade, they can believe that only incompetent agents would buy a name rather than "build" one. As a result, providing clients with information about name trades can cause the market for names to fail and reduce social surplus. In some cases, however, the identity of new owners is public information. This, for example, is pertinent to medical practices in which new doctors are known to clients. The possible limitations of the insights above, and ways to accommodate them into a more general theory of reputation, are discussed in Section VII.
A third result is that the market for names cannot separate between more and less able agents. In particular, there is no equilibrium in which good agents fully separate themselves by buying successful names. Intuitively, if only good agents buy successful names, then clients cannot update beliefs downward when these names perform poorly. Hence, bad agents will value successful names more than good agents because their alternative option of starting their own successful name is bleak. A direct implication of this result is that the model generates sensible reputation dynamics: reputations increase after good performance and decrease after bad performance, a crucial characteristic for reputations to provide incentives.
An important difference between this paper and other reputation models is the market equilibrium approach employed here, which closes the model with respect to determining the value of a reputation. This is key in deriving two of the main results in this paper: that incentives are ageless and that the market for names cannot fully sort agents. Standard repeated-game models do not reveal these insights because they offer no direct economic link between the market for services and the prices agents pay for names. When a market equilibrium analysis is employed, the value of having a good reputation is determined vis-à-vis the option of having no reputation in the market for services.
There is a small literature beyond Kreps (1990) that models firm reputation as a tradable asset. In Tadelis (1999) , an overlapping generations model with adverse selection but without moral hazard is analyzed, and it generates trade in names and a similar no-sorting result. The lack of moral hazard, however, prevents the model from analyzing incentive provision and welfare, which are central to this paper. Fang (1998) introduces moral hazard into a model that is similar to Tadelis (1999) . Fang shows that reputational concerns of selling a good reputation can overcome moral hazard, but the lack of a general equilibrium analysis prevents tying incentives of old and young agents. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) consider a different model in which a firm provides a service for clients, and the observed quality is a noisy signal of the firm's actions (imperfect monitoring). They too do not analyze the nature of life cycle incentives.
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There is another literature that is concerned with providing incentives to older agents using an overlapping generations demography without trade of reputations. Crémer (1986) shows that agents with finite lifetimes can belong to an organization (or social norm) that is an infinite entity, and some cooperation can be supported in equilibrium. Alesina and Spear (1988) and Harrington (1992) show that short-lived politicians can choose "far-sighted" policies using a party that plays a role similar to that of Crémer's organization. Another related but more distant literature was introduced by Becker and Stigler (1974) and developed further by Lazear (1979) . In these models a sequence of increasing 3 They do show that bad types are likely to value a very good reputation more than good types. Their partial equilibrium analysis requires an exogenous assumption that good types have a better outside option than bad types, which arises endogenously in this paper's model. Another paper that combines moral hazard and adverse selection to generate interesting reputation dynamics is Diamond (1989) , but there, reputations belong to individuals and are not traded.
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wages guarantees that the future of a finitely lived agent's career is valuable, even as he reaches the end of his career.
II. The Economy
Consider a model in which in each period risk-neutral agents sell goods (or offer services) to risk-neutral clients for that period only. An outcome is either a success (high-quality), which gives a client a payoff of one, or a failure (low-quality), which gives a client a payoff of zero. Clients face both adverse selection and moral hazard. In particular, there are two indistinguishable types of agents: good agents, or G types, in proportion g, and opportunistic agents, or O types, in proportion A 1 Ϫ g. G type succeeds with probability and an O type can choose P (0, 1), G his probability of success by exerting effort at a private cost e [0, 1] c(e), where his probability of success is given by Moral hazard P (e) p eP .
O G
is captured by assuming that effort is costly, For convenience, c (e) 1 0. assume that is twice continuously differentiable and that (to c (7) c (7) 1 0 ensure a unique solution to the agent's problem), and let 4 c(0) p 0. Assume that agents are active in the economy for two periods, after which they retire, and wealth is valuable for retirement. Agents live as overlapping generations in which the total size of the population and the distribution of types of agents are constant over time. In contrast, clients live for only one period and can observe the firms' track records. As in Diamond (1989) and Tadelis (1999) , the implication of this assumption is that a firm's reputation, summarized by its past performance, is the only intertemporal linkage.
Each agent in this economy runs his own firm, which is represented by a name, and it is assumed that every firm has a unique and distinct name. An agent can either choose a new name to represent his firm (which implies that he will have no track record) or buy a name from an agent who is about to retire, thus inheriting the track record associated with that name. The value of a firm's service is determined by the perfect observation of that firm's past performance and by the beliefs of clients that such past performance generates.
There is a continuum of clients and agents, and the price of supplying a service is determined competitively. To simplify, assume that the clients are on the long side of the market (a larger measure) so that each client pays her expected surplus when transacting with an agent. The results are robust to any division that gives the agents some positive surplus. Assumption 1. The transaction's outcome is not contractible.
That is, problems of (court) verifiability prevent the parties from writing outcome-contingent contracts that depend on the realization of the outcome. This standard assumption implies that each client who employs an agent will pay up front the whole expected value of the service supplied.
Assumption 2. Shifts of name ownership are not observable by clients. This means that the actual identity of the agent who provides the service is separated from the firm's entity, that is, the name. This turns out to be a key property that introduces important noise into the economy: the impact of the current owner on the firm's past performance is uncertain. In reality, shifts of ownership are often obscure. Of course, at some cost almost everything is observable, but to make the point, assumption 2 considers the extreme case of infinite costs of observation. This extreme assumption can be weakened to accommodate a situation in which only part of the population is ignorant to changes of ownership, in which case some qualitative results would carry over. This is further discussed in Sections V and VII.
Assumption 3. At the beginning of each period, every active agent can either choose to retain his past name or unobservably change it.
This assumption is symmetric to assumption 2 and allows a complete separation of a client's identity from his firm. Once an agent chooses a new name, his past performance is erased and he can just as well be an agent who has now arrived into the economy with a clean record. It is reasonable to allow an agent to abandon his name and buy a name from another agent. In equilibrium, however, it turns out that agents who wish to abandon their past are indifferent between choosing a new name and buying a name. Therefore, assume without loss that agents who choose to erase their past will also choose a new name.
Assumption 4. An arbitrarily small independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) measure of agents cannot change their name. e ≥ 0 This assumption eliminates some "unreasonable belief" equilibria, as will be described in Section III, and plays a role similar to that of "trembles" for refining unreasonable beliefs in extensive form games. The trembles selected are not "special" in that they uniquely generate the type of equilibria that are analyzed. Any combination of trembles that involves some "stickiness" of names will suffice to weed out equilibria with unreasonable beliefs.
5 Assumptions 3 and 4 together can be thought of as a reduced form of a more realistic process of name changing (this is discussed in Tadelis [1999] ). To save on notation, I shall take ; e p 0 for example, an infinite but countable number of agents from each type cannot change their name. The sequence of events in each period is illustrated in figure 1 . 
III. Benchmark: No Market for Reputations
This section outlines a benchmark model that relates this paper to previous models in the reputation literature. The analysis of an economy without a market for reputations will also provide a useful benchmark for the welfare analysis of Section V.
In what follows, restrict attention to two periods, each with the sequence of events depicted in figure 1. To capture an overlapping generations demography, there will be three generations: generation 0 lives in the first period, generation 1 lives in both periods, and generation 2 lives in the second period. Furthermore, the size (measure) of each generation is equal. Thus this economy will always consist of a proportion g of G types and a proportion of O types. These demographics 1 Ϫ g are described in figure 2.
It is assumed throughout the benchmark analysis that names cannot be traded. This implies that all generation 2 agents will have new names at the beginning of period 2. Agents of generation 1 will have the choice of sticking to their name or changing it, and agents of generation 0 will retire, and their firms' names will cease to exist.
The solution concept is a rational expectations equilibrium, which naturally applies to the model. In particular, at the beginning of t p all agents have no history, and the wage w 1 will depend on clients' 1, beliefs about the effort level of O types. Since only past histories are observable, assume that two names with the same history generate the same expectations. This implies that at the beginning of there t p 2 will be history-dependent wages conditional on whether an agent had a past success (S), a failure (F), or a new name (N). Denote these wages by w (h), h {S, F, N }.
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A first obvious fact is that generation 1 agents who failed in period 1 will be better off changing their names and disguising themselves as the new agents. This is easily verified using Bayes' rule: if clients believed that names were not changed after a failure, then an agent with a past failure must be, on average, "worse" than an agent with a new name. As a result, and from assumptions 3 and 4, in equilibrium, only S and N histories are observed with positive probability in period (there t p 2 will be a measure of F names). A second obvious fact is that O e p 0 types will choose in their last active period since they have no e p 0 future to look forward to and their wages are paid up front. This implies that and depend only on the clients' beliefs about a G type's
likelihood of having such a history. Let denote the conditional Pr {GFh} probability that an agent is a G type given history h.
Assume without loss that second-period income is not discounted, so that the expected lifetime utility of a G type at is t p 1
and the expected utility of an O type depends on his choice of effort e, yielding
The equilibrium effort choice of O types will affect second-period wages, and these in turn feed back into the incentives of O types. Thus an equilibrium will be characterized by a tuple Ae,
S, where e is a best response given wages, and wages are correct w (F ) 2 given e. With correct beliefs about e,
1 G 2 because all G types of generations 0 and 1 will succeed with probability P G , and only half the O types (generation 1) will succeed with probability eP G (recall that generation 0 O types exert no effort). As mentioned earlier, what determine second-period wages are the correct beliefs of a G type behind any history, and they are calculated by applying Bayes'
rule. In particular, given an effort level equilibrium beliefs e [0, 1], imply that
That is, a firm with a past success is generated by G types and O types from generation 1 who succeeded, which accounts for (3) above. A firm with a new name is generated by all new (generation 2) agents and by all the agents from generation 1 who failed (and then changed their names), which accounts for (4) above. Given the equilibrium beliefs in (3) and (4), equilibrium wages are calculated by the equation (recall that clients value success at one and failure
The wage differential, provides incentives for
young O types of generation 1. The effort level that maximizes their expected utility given in (1) above solves the first-order condition, Note that the equilibrium level of effort will be suboptimal P Dw p c (e).
G since optimal effort must solve 6 It is also easy to see that Dw P p c (e). 
G H
The proofs of all the results are in the appendices. The intuition for proposition 1 is illustrated in figure 3 . If in the first period, then e p 0 success must be attributed to good types, and the wage differential premium ( ) is greatest. This can be an equilibrium only if the P Dw G H marginal cost of effort at is too high, which is the condition e p 0 In figure 3 this occurs at the equilibrium point A, for the P Dw ≤ c (0). In summary, career concerns help solve the moral hazard problem for young agents, but not for old agents. This will provide a useful benchmark to analyze the effects of a market for reputations on the moral hazard problem of old and young agents.
IV. The Market for Reputations
This section describes the economic forces that cause reputations-captured by the firms' names-to be traded in equilibrium. The analysis continues with a two-period model as shown in figure 2. This demonstrates that the results are independent of the economy's horizon 7 In a discrete model in which O types can be good ( ) or bad ( ), e p 1 e p 0 e is like a mixed-strategy equilibrium. This would be similar to Kreps et al. (1982) (0, 1) and Diamond (1989) . length, as long as the flavor of overlapping generations is maintained together with the model's assumptions.
As before, clients will pay firms up front for their services given their (correct) beliefs about the composition of agents' types for each name and the actions of O types. At the beginning of agents from t p 1, generations 0 and 1 choose names for their firms. Since no prior information is available to the clients, they will pay the same wage to all firms (as in the benchmark model), which depends on the behavior of O types in At date there is more going on. As in the t p 1. t p 2, benchmark model, there will be two kinds of firms: with and without a past history. In contrast, however, firms with a past history of success can be operated either by a continuing agent who succeeded and did not change his name or by a new agent who bought the name from a retiring agent.
An equilibrium will be characterized by the wages that clients pay to agents (firms) at by the strategies of O types of each generation t p 1, in every period, and by prices in two markets at : the wages clients t p 2 pay to firms with different track records and the prices agents from generation 2 will pay for names with different track records that belonged to agents from generation 0. As before, since only past histories are observable, assume that two names with the same history generate the same expectations. Notice that it is assumed that only retiring agents from generation 0 can sell their names, and only new agents from generation 2 can buy names. Equilibria can be constructed in which agents from generation 1 sell and buy names, but because of the indifference result established in lemma 1 below, these equilibria are equivalent to the set of equilibria identified in the paper (with a different distribution of rents). In addition, restrict attention to equilibria in which only S names are traded, so that all agents who fail in the first period will change their name.
8 As before, denote wages at by t p 2 and let denote the price of S names.
Proposition 2. S names must be traded in all equilibria.
The proof of this proposition shows that if clients believed that S names were not being traded, then these names would become valuable assets that will trigger trade. Intuitively, there is always a supply of S names at the beginning of (at least from the good types of generation 0 t p 2 who succeeded). Therefore, no trade of S names in equilibrium implies that having a past success must be worthless to agents in This in t p 2. turn implies that opportunistic agents in the first period have no incentive to exert effort because it generates no future benefits. But if S names are not traded, then successful histories must belong to good types of generation 1, who continue to the second period. This would create high expectations for future success, which means that new agents will be willing to buy these names and disguise themselves as good types, since trading names is not observable.
If clients observe name trades, then this proposition fails: assigning "pessimistic" beliefs to clients that only bad types buy names supports an equilibrium with no trade of names.
9 Thus the lack of information regarding trade of names is a driving force that guarantees an active market for names. Whether or not name trading is socially beneficial needs to be determined by considering the effects of markets for names on incentives in equilibrium. The following result is helpful to characterize equilibria of the two-period model. Lemma 1. In any equilibrium, all new agents will be indifferent between buying an S name and not buying one, and
This follows because in any equilibrium, depends only on cliw (h) 2 ents' beliefs, which do not depend on the outcome of the second period. Since this is the last period, all types have the same benefit from buying an S name. As the supply of S names is scarce, the price of an S name must be set to cause indifference, which is the only way to clear the market. This leads to the following result.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium, all first-period O types have identical incentives and thus choose the same effort level.
The intuition is simple: since the price of a name will be v(S) p (lemma 1), the wage differential that concerns young O types of Dw generation 1 is equal to the sales premium that concerns old O types from generation 0, causing incentives to be "ageless." Thus the incentives provided by career concerns (the wage premium) are quantitatively identical to the incentives created by the market for names; incentives are independent of an agent's future horizon. This striking result illuminates the merits of a market equilibrium analysis in which wages and prices of names are tied down together. Note that in the model agents are active for only two periods, but the economic intuition seems quite general. Namely, a history generates value because it creates an expected sequence of wages to its owner and an expectation of selling the realized future. If valuable histories are scarce, then the price they command should equal their added value. This in turn means that, regardless of the owner's age, he is internalizing the future sequence of these values (a "no-arbitrage" condition).
journal of political economy
To continue with the equilibrium analysis, notice that the only endogenous parameter that affects the first-period wage is the (correct) beliefs clients have about the actions of O types in the first period. The first-period wage must satisfy
1 G similar to (2) in the benchmark model, but now all O types of generations 0 and 1 succeed with probability eP G , not only the young of generation 1.
In any rational expectations equilibrium, clients must have correct beliefs about the composition of new agents who buy names at t p 2. Let m (respectively r) denote the proportion of good (respectively opportunistic) types who buy S names at An equilibrium for the t p 2. two-period model will be a tuple Am, r, e, w 1 , S.
Note that the wages firms charge clients and the prices new agents are willing to pay for names will be generated by the correct beliefs about (m, r, e), which uniquely determine the other equilibrium parameters.
In equilibrium, (m, r, e) must satisfy market clearing,
G G which guarantees that the supply of S names (the left-hand side of [5] ) is equal to the demand (the right-hand side of [5] ). Recall that clients will pay their full expected surplus up front, so in equilibrium it must be that, for all h, (only G types succeed in ). w (h) p Pr {GFh} 7 P t p 2 2 G Given (m, r, e), by Bayes' rule,
where the second equality in both equations follows from market clearing and simple algebra. The following proposition characterizes the set of equilibria in which only S names are traded. Proposition 4 implies that there is a continuum of equilibria with respect to prices: the interval is nonempty, and any [m, m] m [m, m]c an be supported in equilibrium. This follows from the indifference result of lemma 1, which established that the price for names must be equal to the wage differential they generate. The equilibrium price for S names is increasing in m (the proportion of G types who buy them) so that supports the lowest-price equilibrium. Depending on pam p m rameter values, the lowest price is either zero (many good types-high g-implies that having no history is quite good) or positive (very few good types-low g-implies that even if only O types buy S names, these names are still better than having no history). Any equilibrium with commands a positive price for S names.
The multiplicity of equilibria, which are all qualitatively similar, makes it difficult to analyze the effect of the market for names on the incentives of opportunistic agents in comparison to the benchmark model. A way to proceed is to identify a reasonable equilibrium selection and then compare the two models in which each has a unique equilibrium. Since the multiplicity arises because sellers who buy names are indifferent, it is reasonable to assume that the matching between buyers and sellers of names is random, which causes the composition of types of name buyers to be equal to the exogenous composition of types. This implies that m and r are given by * * m p r p gP ϩ (1 Ϫ g)eP .
G G
This selection can be endogenized by adding a second dimension of agent heterogeneity that would break the indifference demonstrated in lemma 1 and choose the selection above as a unique equilibrium. For example, agents may vary with respect to their cost of purchasing a firm versus building a new one: when an agent creates his own firm, it is tailored to his specifications, whereas buying an existing enterprise may require some adaptations or modifications. This is explicitly modeled in Tadelis (2002 From (6) and (7), it is straightforward to compute the * c (e) p Dw(m )P .
G high-and low-wage differentials:
V. Incentive Effects and Welfare Analysis
As proposition 2 implies, if the identity of new owners is public information, then pessimistic beliefs will cause the market for names to shut down, resulting in an economy with no trade of names. By comparing the models in Sections III and IV (without and with a market for names), one can perform welfare comparisons.
Compared to the benchmark model, name trading will have two effects: First, for the agents of generation 0, it provides a potential incentive to exert effort in their terminal period. Second, the incentives for the agents of generation 1 in their initial period may be changed, thus affecting their career concerns. This second effect on "young" agents is ambiguous: it may be that the introduction of a market for names will cause the wage differential to decrease, thus lowering their incentives.
To see how parameters affect the welfare conclusions, it is again illustrative to consider the high-wage differential. 
whereas the first-order condition for the model with a market for names is (8) and (9) ure 4b illustrates that for high values of P G , trade is more efficient, whereas for low values of P G , no trade is more efficient. I cannot claim that there are "reasonable" welfare conclusions as to whether trade of names is better or worse. Instead, it is interesting to realize that more information, that is, making name transfers observable, can cause the market for names to collapse and eliminate incentives for older agents. In many cases of the model, this can be detrimental for social surplus.
To more seriously consider young and old agents, the next section considers the infinite-horizon economy. It shows that the results obtained above are robust and derives an interesting no-sorting result.
VI. Longer Horizons and Reputational Sorting
Consider the infinite-horizon version of the model described above. In every period a new cohort of agents enters the economy and can buy names from the cohort that is retiring, so that the economy never terminates. After living for one period, agents can either continue with their name or change it; after two periods, they can sell their name. The following proposition parallels proposition 2 for the infinite-horizon model.
Proposition 5. Names consisting of only successes must be traded in all equilibria.
The proof of this proposition is omitted since it is almost identical to the proof of proposition 2. The intuition is the same: these names have a positive supply, and under the assumption of no trade, it must be that they convey positive information and therefore have value.
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Since names are associated with histories, this introduces a rather demanding and complex problem for the analysis of the infinite-horizon model. Formally, the set of histories H is the set of all finite-and infinitelength histories consisting of successes and failures (including N, no history). Then, there can possibly be an infinite number of histories with different reputation values.
A way to simplify the analysis is to distinguish between histories and reputations (see Tadelis 2002) . Appendix B introduces a formal reduction of histories into equivalence classes using a well-defined reputation reduction. This reduction is rather straightforward, and it uses the model's stationarity.
Using this reduction, Appendix B analyzes a stationary steady-state equilibrium (SSE) that is similar qualitatively to the equilibrium of the two-period model: names last as long as they do not fail; once they fail, they are rationally discarded. The wage differentials for the derived SSE are exactly those derived for the two-period model, but since there is no terminal period, incentives are provided in every period. Note that the equilibrium identified in the finite-horizon benchmark model is the unique stationary SSE for the infinite-horizon model without trade of names.
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An intuitive conjecture is that if the economy lasts for more than two periods, then the value of a good reputation should be higher for a good type who is more likely to maintain it than for an opportunistic type who has to exert effort to do so. This reasoning would be consistent with the theories of Klein and Leffler (1981) and Kreps (1990) , if their ideas were incorporated into the current incomplete information framework. That is, if good types find it easier to maintain a reputation, then they should be able to outbid opportunistic types who are more likely to ruin a reputation. Notice, however, that in the equilibrium analyzed above, this separation did not occur. It turns out that this is no coincidence, as the following proposition states.
Proposition 6. For the infinite-horizon model, there is no equilibrium in which only S names are traded, and they are bought only by good types and by opportunistic types who choose to be good.
To see this, consider a candidate sorting equilibrium in which only 11 The proof that NS names must be traded in every period (where NS means that the name was created last period and had a success) is identical to the proof of proposition 2. An induction argument implies that all names with any consecutive number of successes (with no failures) must be traded.
12 One can possibly construct cyclical equilibria for the model without trade of names. Intuitively, if in every odd period O types work harder than in every even period, then the wage differential in odd periods is lower than that in even periods, which supports this type of cyclical behavior. good types buy S names. This means that clients must (correctly) predict that any S name is bought by a good type, so that a name with a history that starts with a success is more likely to belong to a good type no matter what the continuation history will be. This may seem somewhat counterintuitive, but the intuition is quite simple: If a name had a success in period t, then the person who continues with this name at period t ϩ is more likely to be good. Thus failures will not be "punished" with 1 low wages since clients cannot update their beliefs too strongly, and the value of the name will remain high.
This, in turn, causes O types to value an S name more than G types because the value of buying an S name depends on the alternative option of not buying one. The O types face a less attractive future if they start with a new name because it is harder for them to build a good reputation. Therefore, if the stream of payments from having an S name is the same (or close) for both types, then having a poor alternative will make O types value an S name more than G types. Thus, in any equilibrium, enough O types (choosing ) buy S names so that clients e ! 1 will sufficiently update their beliefs after a name with a good reputation starts failing.
In Tadelis (1999) , two reputational effects arise in a pure adverse selection model. The reputation maintenance effect captures the idea that more able types are more likely to maintain a good name. This allows good types to reap benefits over a longer horizon (on average), which in turn gives them a higher willingness to pay for a good name. The reputation start-up effect captures the idea that good types can more easily build a good name. Therefore, if a firm's reputation does not depreciate, then good types will have a lower willingness to pay than bad types. The introduction of moral hazard in this paper shows the generality of these effects. It is the market equilibrium approach of both models that identifies the alternative of buying a good name, which is building one.
13

VII. Concluding Remarks
A. Summary
This paper suggests that if firm names can change hands without clients' awareness, then clients must constantly update their beliefs about the type of agent running the firm. Furthermore, their updating must follow 13 With terminology from the signaling literature, the "single-crossing" condition in my model is endogenous and depends on who buys names. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) develop a repeated-game model with incomplete information and imperfect monitoring and show that when a reputation is "too good," it is more likely to be bought by a bad type. Given their partial equilibrium approach, however, they need to exogenously assume that good types have a better outside option than bad types. In my models the outside option is derived endogenously using a market equilibrium analysis. a sensible rule: good performance causes higher expectations, whereas bad performance causes lower expectations. These dynamics cause good reputations to have value, which in turn gives agents incentives to maintain a good reputation throughout their career.
An important difference between the model in this paper and standard models of reputation is in the market equilibrium approach employed here. This is key in deriving two main results. First, young and old agents face the same incentives created by the market. The markets for services and for names are linked: good names are scarce, and their price captures their full value-the wage differential they generate in the market for services. Second, reputations cannot fully sort good agents from opportunistic ones. Models of reputation that use a partial equilibrium repeated-games approach, such as Klein and Leffler (1981) or Kreps (1990) , show that good reputations support good behavior. One might then conclude that good reputations will be valued more by agents who intend to be good, either by characteristic (type) or by choice (action). A market equilibrium analysis, however, shows that such separation is impossible. The value of a reputation depends on the updating of clients' beliefs, which depends on the types of agents that buy reputations. If "too many" of the agents buying good names are expected to perform well, then failure causes weak updating of client beliefs. This in turn causes good reputations to be valued more by agents who are less competent, because the alternative of starting with a clean record is bad for them.
B. Extensions
This paper is an attempt to model, and understand, a possible mechanism that provides incentives for older agents and contributes to the literature on life cycle incentives. The central assumption, that clients do not observe transfers of ownership, is not reasonable for all industries (e.g., medical practices). An owner of a good reputation (a successful clientele) would very much like to announce that he is selling his name to a good type and then get a higher price for the firm's good name. But proposition 6 implies that this is impossible: there is no credible way that an owner could commit to selling to a good type, even if he can distinguish between good and opportunistic types and clients can observe trade. 14 Indeed, it is realistic to assume that experienced medical doctors, lawyers, or accountants have some ability to identify and screen the young professionals who can take over their practice. In this case, the senior owners would want to commit to selling their firm to competent successors. One way to implement this is to employ young agents in a sort of "apprentice relationship" and make this observable to their clients. Then, after clients observe the good outcome generated by the young professional, their beliefs are more secure, and the senior owner can sell the firm (the clientele) at a higher price. Screening would be an equilibrium if bad outcomes would cause a loss of reputation, which directly harms the senior owner.
Notice that this story is different from the model of the paper in several important ways, primarily the ability to screen young professionals and the ability of clients to observe these apprentice relationships and trade of ownership (or at least promotion to partner). By modeling these issues seriously and building on the insights of this paper, one may be able to develop an interesting theory of such relationships. This is left for future research.
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C. Empirical Relevance
The model of this paper is very stylized but seems to fit small owneroperated firms with transient clients, such as restaurants and small service businesses, but is harder to link to larger firms. Nonetheless, the insights may apply to more complex organizations and shed some light on incentive provision. For example, the results suggest that key figures in an organization should have a stake in the organization's future reputation. Gibbons and Murphy (1992) show that the loss of career concerns of managers close to retirement can be supplemented by explicit contracts. They support their theoretical results with data, yet the strength of explicit incentives observed (a share of current profit) is remarkably low. Since future, and not current, prospects are at the heart of reputational incentives, it would be wise to compensate older managers with vested stocks/options. In a recent article, Murphy (1999) indicates that top executive compensation has a large component of longterm vested stock options. This idea complements Fama's (1980) argument: competitive forces in the managerial labor market alleviate moral hazard, but there must be a stake in the firm's future, beyond a manager's finite career. Some of the value of a firm's name should be allocated to managerial labor. Notice that a version of the nonobserv-ability assumption 2 is not implausible. Even if analysts and investors see such changes in management, it is enough that clients of the firm's product are oblivious to these staffing changes, since their beliefs about future performance are what generate value to the firm's reputation.
In organizations with many agents, there may be a free-rider problem associated with maintaining a good name. In their seminal paper, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) raise an important question related to freeriding in an organization: "One method of reducing shirking is for someone to specialize as a monitor to check the input performance of team members. But who will monitor the monitor?" (pp. 781-82). They suggested that the monitor is provided with correct incentives when he is the residual claimant to the team's profits. The argument is that market forces will cause the monitor to internalize the social costs and benefits of monitoring. But monitors do have finite careers, implying that monitors should lose incentives as their career comes to its end. This paper suggests that the residual claimant to a firm's profits should also be the residual claimant to the value of its name, thus internalizing the full current and future value of his monitoring efforts.
D. Policy Relevance
Casual empiricism suggests that modern capitalist economies have legal systems that support the separation of entity from identity and facilitate well-functioning markets for names. Names are identified as proprietary assets with well-defined property rights. The analysis above suggests that without such property rights and markets for names, incentives are eroded as entrepreneurial agents approach retirement. Therefore, such legal systems are indeed beneficial from an efficiency perspective: the market for firms' names is complementary to both product and labor markets in a well-functioning market economy.
With respect to small owner-operated ("mom and pop") businesses, the analysis suggests that a regulatory action that makes the event of a name transfer public information can be socially harmful: the market for names can collapse, thereby destroying the endogenous incentives created by this market.
16 This is a rather stark suggestion, and there are many caveats that lie in the assumptions of the model. For example, if there is a valuable "match" component between agents' ability and clients' needs, then identifying when a firm changes ownership may be very important to those types of clients.
On a final note, the analysis may also suggest that different tax dis-tortions will cause distortions in the dynamics of career concerns. For example, with respect to such small owner-operated firms, young agents are subject to income taxes, whereas retiring agents will pay capital gains taxes from the sale of a successful name. Thus the relative magnitude of these two tax instruments can affect the dynamic allocation of effort. Similar implications can be relevant for the taxation of vested stock options. If the tax rates on these options differ from income taxes, this again can create a distortion in the lifetime career concerns of managers. Clearly, there are many other issues that are important for taxation, and this discussion raises one more possibility for consideration. 
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This reduction implies that clients take any one of the infinite number of histories and map them into one of four classes: {N, S, M, F}. The analysis that follows will focus on the unique stationary SSE consistent with the equilibrium selection of random matching and consistent with restricting attention to the case in which only S names are traded (it will be confirmed that F or M names will not be traded, and agents with M or F names would prefer to change them to N names). That is, the names from the equivalence class H S are randomly assigned to the young agents who enter the economy. It will also be confirmed that the restriction to these four classes is consistent with equilibrium beliefs, so that no irrationality is involved.
Denote the SSE wages as and respectively. In each w(N ), w(S), w(M ), w(F ), period there are "young" and "old" agents as in any standard overlapping generations model. The following result is parallel to proposition 3.
Proposition B1. In any SSE, all young and old O types have identical incentives and thus choose the same effort level. u (N ) .
types have a larger benefit from owning an S name, which contradicts the assumption that only G types buy S names at in equilibrium. Q.E.D. t p 2
